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Abstract 
The launch of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, followed by the Sustainable 
Development Goals in 2015, and the increasing focus on achieving universal health coverage has 
led to numerous interventions on both supply- and demand-sides of health systems in low- and 
middle-income countries. While tremendous progress has been achieved, inequities in access to 
healthcare persist, leading to calls for a closer examination of the equity implications of these 
interventions. This paper examines the equity implications of two such interventions in the context 
of maternal healthcare in Senegal. The first intervention on the supply-side focuses on improving 
the availability of maternal health services while the second intervention, on the demand-side, 
abolished user fees for facility deliveries. Using three rounds of Demographic Health Surveys 
covering the period 1992 to 2010 and employing three measures of socioeconomic status (SES) 
based on household wealth, mothers’ education and rural/urban residence – we find that although 
both interventions increase utilisation of maternal health services, the rich benefit more from the 
supply-side intervention, thereby increasing inequity, while the poor benefit more from the 
demand-side intervention i.e. reducing inequity. Both interventions positively influence facility 
deliveries in rural areas although the increase in facility deliveries after the demand-side 
intervention is more than the increase after the supply-side intervention. There is no significant 
difference in utilisation based on mothers’ education. Since people from different SES categories 
are likely to respond differently to interventions on the supply- and demand-side of the health 
system, policymakers involved in the design of health programmes should pay closer attention to 
concerns of inequity and elite capture that may unintentionally result from these interventions.  
 
Keywords: Senegal; exemption; quality of care; equity; maternal health; access; emergency 
obstetric care; user fees. 
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Introduction  
The launch of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in 2000, followed by the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG) in 2015, and the increasing focus on achieving Universal Health 
Coverage (UHC) – has led to numerous interventions on both the supply- and demand-side of 
health systems in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC). Supply-side interventions operate by 
improving the supply of healthcare and include interventions such as increasing the number, 
coverage, and training of health professionals. While, demand-side interventions operate by 
increasing the demand for healthcare such as reducing the cost of accessing healthcare and 
providing incentives for seeking care. A large body of evidence shows that while tremendous 
progress has been achieved as a result of both supply- and demand-side interventions – poor often 
tend to benefit less than the rich, leading to calls for a closer examination of the differential 
influence of supply- and demand-side interventions on equity (Ensor & Cooper, 2004; McPake et 
al., 2013; O'Donnell et al., 2007; Victora et al., 2018; Wagstaff et al., 2014).  
Consider the case of West Africa where in 1980s and 90s, under international influence, 
user fees were introduced in the health system (See for example Akin et al., 1987; Ridde, 2015). It 
was envisaged the additional revenue from user fees will provide the impetus to improve the 
quality of services (supply). As a result, even though there is some evidence to suggest an 
improvement in quality of care, to a large extent these policies worsened demand-side barriers and 
adversely effected utilisation, especially amongst the poor (Lagarde & Palmer, 2011). One of the 
main reasons for inequity in healthcare utilisation was and still remains – that poorer households 
find it more difficult to overcome demand-side barriers (De Allegri et al., 2011; McPake, 1993). 
Even when households have health insurance, high out-of-pocket (OOP) expenses due to user 
fees, transport, and medicines can be a major hurdle in increasing utilisation amongst the poor, 
who may choose to seek alternate care from traditional healers or quacks (Shahrawat & Rao, 
2012). Therefore, government interventions that primarily focus on the supply-side, such as 
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training more health professionals, can make healthcare utilisation more inequitable as the benefits 
of these supply-side improvements are more likely to go to richer households who have lower 
demand-side barriers (Demery, 2000). 
To improve utilisation, since the early 2000s, West African countries have introduced 
policy interventions on the demand-side that have either abolished or subsidised user fees. For 
instance, in the context of maternal health, Ghana introduced free facility deliveries in 2003 (Bosu 
et al., 2007), Senegal in 2005 (Witter et al., 2010) and Burkina Faso subsidised user fees in 2007 
(Ridde et al., 2015). Mali removed user fees for only caesarean deliveries in 2005, followed by 
Benin and Morocco in 2009 (Dossou et al., 2018; Ravit et al., 2018; Witter et al., 2016). Evidence 
from these schemes show that demand-side interventions that reduce barriers to access by 
reducing or eliminating user fees at health facilities make healthcare more equitable as poor 
households are now more likely to access healthcare (Peters et al., 2008; Ridde & Morestin, 
2011); albeit the poorest are still often the least likely to utilise facility-based care (Ridde et al., 
2015).  
More recently, researchers have also pointed out some issues emanating from these 
policies that are often driven by political calculations and donor influence, without fully exploring 
the holistic influence on the balance of demand and supply (Ridde et al., 2015). For instance, 
national political attention is largely focused on the demand-side – perhaps because these 
interventions are more readily visible to voters; but as a result the supply-side is often neglected, 
putting excessive strain on the health system (McPake et al., 2013; Nabyonga-Orem et al., 2008). 
This can adversely impact quality of care (Hardeman et al., 2004; Noirhomme et al., 2007), and 
more significantly, it can also increase inequity due to elite capture: as more people compete for 
limited services, individuals who can exert disproportionate influence on the system tend to access 
more and better quality services (Wong, 2010). On the other hand, there is increasing donor 
influence on healthcare policies such as performance-based financing, which tend to prioritise the 
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supply-side; but these often receive inadequate buy-in from national governments (Gautier & 
Ridde, 2017) and researchers have raised concerns on the long-term effectiveness of such 
interventions (Paul et al., 2018).    
Although prior research provides evidence on the influence of single interventions, there is 
a paucity of evidence that provides insights on the differential influence of supply- and demand-
side interventions on equity in utilisation in the same context. In this paper, we aim to address this 
gap by investigating these dynamics: how is equity in healthcare utilisation influenced by supply- 
and demand-side interventions? Using the case of Senegal, we examine inequities in utilisation of 
maternal health services in relation to two sequential interventions – the first intervention, on the 
supply-side, focuses on improving the availability of maternal health services, and the second 
intervention on the demand-side focuses on abolishing user fees for facility deliveries. Even 
though, due to limitations in the data and design of the study, we are unable to make causal 
claims, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study examining the sequential and combined 
effects of supply- and demand-side interventions on improving utilisation of maternal health 
services. The sequential implementation is important as the quality of services is improved before 
increasing demand to ensure women who access health facilities receive good quality of care. By 
assessing how supply- and demand-side interventions influence equity in the same context (i.e. 
Senegal), this analysis allows us to identify the implications for policymakers, who often focus on 
one side more than the other.    
Our research focus – maternal health services in Senegal – is particularly relevant as over 
the past two decades, there have been significant investments in improving maternal health in 
LMICs – especially in West Africa (Nyamtema et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2011). On the supply-
side, there have been investments in antenatal care, availability of skilled birth attendants during 
deliveries, and improvements in the provision of emergency obstetric care (EmOC). While on the 
demand-side – early experience of user fees abolition in Uganda in 2001 that resulted in increased 
7 
 
utilisation (Deininger & Mpuga, 2005; Nabyonga et al., 2005), combined with the drive to achieve 
targets set out in the MDG, SDG, and UHC – has led many countries to focus on abolishing user 
fees altogether or for specific services and populations (Yates, 2009).  
Unfortunately, despite significant efforts to promote and provide maternal healthcare, 
progress towards achieving the maternal health targets have been slow. The WHO (2016) reports 
that LMICs account for 99% of the global maternal deaths of which sub-Saharan Africa alone 
accounts for 66%. Furthermore, to achieve the SDG target of a global Maternal Mortality Ratio 
(MMR) below 70 – global MMR must reduce by 7.5% each year till 2030, at a rate three times the 
annual rate of reduction observed between 1990 and 2015. A primary concern towards meeting 
this goal is the slow increase in utilisation of healthcare. For instance, the WHO recommends a 
minimum of four antenatal contacts per pregnancy, which has recently been revised to eight 
contacts – but, in 2012 only 37% of pregnant women in LMIC had at least four antenatal contacts 
(UN, 2014), and the rate is estimated to be even lower in rural areas and amongst poorer 
households (UN, 2018). In this context, in line with the immense interest in a variety of supply- 
and demand-side interventions, the evidence is growing – but several reviews have also reiterated 
the need for better quality evidence, particularly with regards to the magnitude of effect in the 
long term, and deeper analysis to understand the uncertain impact on health and socioeconomic 
inequities (Dzakpasu et al., 2014; Hatt et al., 2013; Lagarde & Palmer, 2011; Ridde & Morestin, 
2011).  
 
Methodology 
Senegal  
Senegal, like several LMICs, continues to face a major challenge in providing equitable maternal 
healthcare. The WHO (2016) reports that while MMR in Senegal has improved from 540 in 1990 
to 315 in 2015, it is significantly higher than the global target of under 70 by 2030. One in 61 women 
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in Senegal faces the lifetime risk of dying due to pregnancy or childbirth-related complications – in 
developed countries, it is one in 4900 women (WHO, 2016).  
Over the last two decades, two large-scale interventions were implemented in Senegal to 
increase utilisation of maternal health services (UNFPA & Immpact, 2008). First on the supply-
side, to address the acute shortage of surgeons and obstetricians-gynecologists, the Ministry of 
Health decided to delegate emergency obstetric care (EmOC) to non-physicians. This programme 
was conducted at two levels of the health systems. At the first level (health posts) nurses were trained 
to provide basic EmOC which included administration of antibiotics, oxytocics and anti-
convulsants, manual delivery of placenta, curettage, and manual intra-uterine aspiration. Only 
assistance at delivery using a vacuum extractor, also considered basic EmOC, was not taught to this 
staff. The training programme included theoretical and practical training lasting 1-2 weeks in 
regional hospitals. At the second level (health centres and district hospitals), surgical teams 
including general practitioners, anaesthetists, and surgical assistants (including midwives) were 
trained in comprehensive EmOC - all functions of basic EmOC and in addition, caesarean sections, 
forceps, and intervention for ectopic pregnancy. The teams received both theoretical and practical 
training, lasting 6 months for general practitioners and 3 months for the other two staff, followed by 
3 months of placement in their local regional hospitals. Eight such teams were to be trained between 
1998-2002, followed by another eight in 2005-2008 (De Brouwere et al., 2009). Since the first set 
of teams became operational in 2001 (De Brouwere et al., 2009), we have considered 2001 as the 
starting point of this intervention.  
The second major intervention was on the demand-side -  Free Delivery and Caesarean 
Policy (FDCP), which provides free deliveries in public health facilities. The intervention was 
launched in 2005 and became fully operational in 2007. In the first year, it was introduced in five 
poor regions in Senegal before it was extended to other regions in 2006 and to Dakar in 2007. In 
2006, FDCP was temporarily restricted to cover only deliveries by caesarean section in regional 
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hospitals but since then it covers all types of deliveries. As part of FDCP, to compensate for the lost 
income, the government provides subsidised kits to public facilities that include supplies for normal 
deliveries (Witter et al., 2008). The regional hospitals receive remuneration of 55,000 FCFA (USD 
89) per caesareans delivery – with some paid in advance, as per an estimated caseload, and the rest 
is reimbursed based on actuals. The government spent USD 1.18 million on FDCP during mid-2005 
to mid-2006, 10% of the total national health budget. 
 
Data 
We use data from three rounds of the Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) conducted between 1997 
and 2010 in Senegal. DHS is a repeated cross-sectional, nationally representative household survey 
designed to collect comparable data on maternal and child health indicators over time. It provides 
individual, household and regional level information. The survey is designed using multi-stage 
stratified probability-based sampling method (For detailed information on the sampling method, 
refer to ANSD and ICF International (2012)).  
The DHS collected information on the socioeconomic and demographic indicators of the 
household. All women (15-49 years) in the household reported on their use of maternal health 
services for children born in the last five years. Using the date of birth, we were able to identify 
child-level data, and therefore, have information on 30,364 children born in the period 1992 to 2010. 
See Figure 1 for the data collection and intervention timeline. 
  
<< Figure 1 >> 
 
Analytical approach 
The main objective of both interventions is to reduce maternal and infant mortality by increasing 
deliveries in health facilities. Therefore, our focus is on the intermediary objective of increasing 
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facility deliveries. To understand changes in facility delivery, our analytical approach observes 
changes in utilisation before and after supply- and demand-side interventions. Note that this 
approach reveals an association, but not a causal relationship. We do not differentiate between 
public and private facilities as the latter is negligible in Senegal. Only 2.7% of all births were in the 
private facilities including NGO-operated facilities in the period 1992-2010. We also examine 
deliveries at home, as an increase in facility deliveries should consequently reduce deliveries at 
home. And finally, we examine whether the birth was assisted by a health professional (doctor, 
nurse or midwife), as delivery by a skilled attendant is one of the main reasons for encouraging 
deliveries at a health facility.  
The EmOC training was aimed at improving emergency care and therefore not directly 
aimed at increasing normal physiological births. However, there is evidence from African and other 
settings that multi-professional EmOC training can improve teamworking, communication and 
respect between different cadres of health workers (Ameh et al., 2012; Bergh et al., 2015; 
Cornthwaite et al., 2015; Grady et al., 2011); it can increase the respect towards midwives and 
enable them to practice more autonomously(Cornthwaite et al., 2015). A Cochrane review of 
midwifery-led continuity of carer has shown that this model of care increases physiological (normal 
vaginal) birth (Sandall et al., 2016).  
To examine the equity effects of the two interventions, we consider three measures of 
socioeconomic status (SES) – household wealth, mothers’ education, and location (urban or rural). 
Household wealth uses the asset-based wealth index provided in the DHS. It is based on household 
ownership of durable assets (e.g. bicycle, radio, telephone) and housing conditions (e.g. water 
source and toilet facilities) and is calculated for each survey using principal component analysis 
(ANSD, 2015). We use this index to create wealth quartiles separately for each survey. Due to the 
low level of education in Senegal, mothers’ education is coded as no education vs some education. 
Finally, the location of the household is categorised as urban or rural. Although SES data is from 
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the time of data collection and not from the time of delivery, we expect these indicators to be stable 
over time especially mothers’ education and location. Since household wealth is a relative measure 
as compared to other households in the region, we expect it to be stable in the short-term. See Table 
1 for variable descriptions.  
 
<< Table 1 >> 
Our model uses the following equation:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑖 ∗  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡) +  𝛽2(𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑖) +  𝛽3(𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡) +  𝛿𝑟 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝐗𝐢𝐭 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  (1) 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 refers to the outcome variable for a child 𝑖 born in time 𝑡. The binary variable 𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑖 denotes the 
socioeconomic status of the household, comparing poor to rich household (wealth quartile 1 vs 
quartile 4), uneducated to educated mothers, or rural to urban households. The variable 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 takes 
the value of 1 for the post-intervention period and 0 for the pre-intervention period. Therefore, when 
assessing Intervention 1 (EmOC), the pre-EmOC is represented by Period 1 and post-EmOC by 
Period 2 as shown in Figure 1. Similarly, when assessing Intervention 2 (FDCP), the pre-FDCP is 
represented by Period 2 and post-FDCP by Period 3. Period 3 does not include years 2005 and 2006 
as FDCP was not fully operational in these two years. The main coefficients of interest are 𝛽1, 𝛽2 
and  𝛽3, which are used to estimate the differential effect of the interventions by socioeconomic 
status in different time periods.  
Any unobservable effects common to all children born in a year are controlled for by the 
year fixed effects 𝛾𝑡. Similarly, region fixed effects, unobservable effects common to all children 
born in a region, are controlled for by 𝛿𝑟. The administrative boundaries of regions were changed 
during our analysis period. To facilitate comparison across the entire period (1992-2010), we use 
the ten regions as defined in DHS-3. Therefore, Matam is clubbed with St. Louis, Kaffrine with 
Kaolack, Kedougou with Tambacounda, and Sedhiou with Kolda. Lastly, matrix 𝐗𝐢𝐭 is the set of 
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control variables which includes ethnicity and sex of household head and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 denotes the random 
error term.   
We use a linear probability model as the interpretation of interaction terms is controversial 
in non-linear probit or logit models (Ai & Norton, 2003; Greene, 2003). In all models, standard 
errors are clustered at the region and household levels to account for serial correlation, and weights 
are used to adjust for survey sampling.  
 
Results 
The descriptive from Table 1 show that in our sample of 30,364 children born during 1992-2010, 
58% were born in health facilities and little over 50% had delivery assisted by a health professional. 
Almost 76% of the mothers in the sample have never attended school and 70% of the households 
were from rural areas.  
 
The regression results (Tables 2-4) and marginal effect graphs (Figure 2) show the differences in 
deliveries by SES. The time periods refer to the pre- and post-intervention periods as shown in 
Figure 1 and the equity effects of the two interventions are captured by the coefficients, interpreted 
as per equation (1). Therefore, the estimated utilisation for Poor (1) and Time (1) i.e. poor 
households after an intervention is 𝛽1(1 ∗ 1) +   𝛽2(1) +  𝛽3(1) =   𝛽1 + 𝛽2 +  𝛽3; and Poor (0) 
and Time (1) i.e. for rich households after an intervention is 𝛽1(0 ∗ 1) +  𝛽2(0) + 𝛽3(1) =   𝛽3; 
and similarly for other combinations of SES and time.   
<< Tables 2, 3, and 4 >> 
<< Figure 2 >> 
 
Household wealth 
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By comparing the influence of the intervention on facility deliveries by household wealth (Figure 
2, left panel), we observe that overall – there has been an increase in facility deliveries amongst both 
the rich and poor households and correspondingly, there has been a fall in home deliveries for both 
SES categories. We also observe that overall the rich are more likely to seek facility delivery and 
they are more sensitive to changes to the supply-side intervention (EmOC) as indicated by the 
steeper increase in utilisation for richer households between Periods 1 and 2; and the poor are more 
sensitive to the demand-side intervention (FDCP) as indicated in the steeper increase in utilisation 
for poorer households between Periods 2 and 3. Similar results are observed for all four wealth 
quartiles (See appendix). The corresponding regression results are shown in Table 2, column 1. 
Before the implementation of EmOC in Period 1, children from poor households are 33% points 
less likely to be born in health facilities as compared to rich households. Although facility deliveries 
increased for both groups after EmOC, by +7% points for poor and +13% points for rich, the 
increase is much larger for the rich, thereby worsening inequities. After EmOC, children from poor 
households are 40% points less likely to be born in health facilities as compared to rich households. 
However, inequity improved after the second intervention, FDCP. The difference between poor and 
rich is 52% points before FDCP and this reduced to 44% points after FDCP. Facility deliveries 
increased by +12% points among poor households and by +4% points among rich households after 
FDCP.  
This trend is reflected in the falling number of home deliveries. While home deliveries are 
higher among the poor, they are reducing over time (Figure 2). The reduction in home deliveries is 
more among the rich compared to the poor, after EmOC (-13% points vs -7% points) while the 
reduction is more among the poor compared to the rich, after the second intervention, FDCP (-12% 
points vs -4% points) as estimated from Table 2, column 2.  
Similarly, for assisted deliveries, although they are increasing over time, they are lower for 
poor households (Figure 2). The increase in assisted deliveries is more for rich compared to poor 
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households after EmOC (+7% points vs +2% points), indicating worsening inequity, while the 
improvement is more for poor compared to rich households after FDCP (+9% points vs +5% points), 
thereby reducing inequity as seen from Table 2, column 3. As shown in Table 1, overall, only half 
of all deliveries were assisted by health staff – of which only 4% of the home deliveries were assisted 
by a health professional. In the case of health facilities, we find that 16% of the deliveries were not 
assisted by health staff of which, 27% of poor households and 8% of rich households had unassisted 
deliveries at a facility.  
 
Mother’s education 
Regarding mother’s education, similar overall trends are observed with increasing facility and 
assisted deliveries and reducing home deliveries over time (Figure 2, middle panel). Further, as seen 
from the regression results in Table 3, facility deliveries increased for uneducated mothers after both 
interventions: +16% points after EmOC and +13% points after FDCP and this increase was more 
than the increase in utilisation amongst educated mothers (+12% points after EmOC and +7% points 
after FDCP), consequently reducing inequity between these two SES categories. This trend is also 
reflected in reducing home deliveries for both educated and uneducated mothers: -16% points and -
12% points after EmOC and -13% points and -7% points after FDCP. Assisted deliveries also show 
corresponding trends i.e. increasing over time. The increase in assisted deliveries after EmOC by 
mother’s education is more for uneducated vs educated mothers (+7% points vs +5% points) but 
this difference is not significant. The increase in assisted deliveries after FDCP is +13% points for 
uneducated mothers and +8% points for educated mothers. The results indicate uneducated mothers 
benefitted more compared to educated mothers, from both interventions.  
 
Location 
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The overall trends of increasing facility and assisted deliveries and reducing home deliveries over 
time are also observed in both rural and urban areas (Figure 2, right panel). For rural households, 
facility deliveries increased substantially after both interventions: +18% points after EmOC and 
+14% points after FDCP, while the increase was relatively less for urban households: +13% points 
and +8% points respectively– indicating an overall reduction in inequities between the two SES 
categories. This was also reflected in reducing home deliveries and increasing assisted deliveries. 
Home deliveries fell by -18% points after EmOC and -14% points after FDCP for rural households 
and by -13% points and -8% points for urban households respectively. Assisted deliveries increased 
by +7% points after EmOC and +15% points after FDCP for rural households and by +6% points 
and +7% points for urban households respectively. The results indicate the rural households 
increased utilisation at a faster rate after both interventions as compared to urban households.  
 
Discussion 
WHO (2013, 6) defines health inequities as “unjust differences in health between persons of 
different social groups and can be linked to forms of disadvantage such as poverty, discrimination 
and lack of access to services or goods”. They propose, since health inequity is a normative 
concept, “observable differences between subgroups within a population [that] can be measured 
and monitored … serves as an indirect means of evaluating health inequity”. Hence, inequity can 
be said to exist when we can show a difference in healthcare utilisation between population 
subgroups that have the same healthcare need (Starfield, 2011). While an absolute measure of 
inequity is useful – policymakers are also concerned with the changes in inequity over time 
especially after introducing new interventions. We draw upon this view and analyse changes in 
inequity in the utilisation of facility deliveries by three measures of SES and over two major 
health system interventions in Senegal.   
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We find that although facility and assisted deliveries are increasing, better-off i.e. 
households that are richer, more educated and in urban areas, continue to have higher utilisation 
than households that are poorer, less educated and in rural areas. Analysis of the changes in 
utilisation show that the rich are more sensitive to interventions on the supply-side while poor are 
more sensitive to interventions on the demand-side. Therefore, inequity in utilisation increased 
after the supply-side intervention and it reduced after the demand-side intervention. Examining 
changes in inequity by mother’s education and household location (rural/ urban) reveal that in 
both instances inequities reduced after both the supply- and demand-side interventions. These 
findings have implications for research which we discuss in this section.  
 
Influence of supply- vs demand-side interventions on equity 
In line with prior research on the topic that has delved into equity analyses by sub-groups of 
wealth, geography, and education (Matthews et al., 2010; Tey & Lai, 2013) – our research also 
sheds light on the changing levels of equity in the context of facility delivery in Senegal. 
However, departing from prior research on the topic, our research provides a more nuanced 
understanding of equity by studying the influence of two sequential interventions: first on the 
supply-side followed by an intervention on the demand-side. We propose that an understanding of 
the differential influence of supply- and demand-side interventions on equity in healthcare 
utilisation is needed for several reasons.  
While healthcare systems seek to balance both supply- and demand-side needs as a whole 
– interventions often target issues on one side more than another. For instance, as Kyei-Nimakoh 
et al. (2017) point out in their review, access to obstetric care faces several supply- and demand-
side barriers, which often focuses policymakers’ attention on designing interventions to target 
specific issues. Supply-side interventions may target issues of coverage of health services, long 
waiting times at health facilities, or inadequate knowledge and skills. Similarly, interventions on 
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the demand-side may focus on out-of-pocket payments, health education, or cultural beliefs. 
Therefore, in practical terms, policymakers will benefit from analyses that provide a distinction 
based on supply- and demand-sides. 
In our study, since the supply-side intervention was introduced before the demand-side 
intervention, the results are useful in understanding the sensitivity of poor vs rich households to 
only supply-side interventions. Our analysis suggests that supply-side interventions are likely to 
increase inequity, as poorer households, who have lower utilisation to begin with, are also less 
sensitive to supply-side interventions, even though overall utilisation in the population increases 
because of the intervention. However, our analysis also suggests, supply-side interventions do not 
influence equity across other SES sub-groups based on mother’s education and location 
(urban/rural) – indicating that financial barriers (partly from OOP expenses) on the demand-side 
could be a significant hurdle in accessing facility deliveries.      
On the demand-side, while our analysis suggests that poorer households do benefit more – 
and therefore demand-side interventions reduces inequity – evidence from prior literature is 
mixed. Dzakpasu et al. (2014) report in their review that the evidence for the impact of the 
abolition of user fees (a common demand-side intervention) on equity is limited and where 
available, the overall direction of effect is inconsistent. At the same time, we find there is also 
evidence to suggest that demand-side interventions improve utilisation. In a programme evaluation 
study in Senegal, Witter et al. (2010) show that there is a significant increase in utilisation in 
normal deliveries in areas that launched the FDCP in 2004–2005, compared to non-FDCP regions. 
Similarly, positive results are reported by McKinnon et al. (2015) who show that the removal of 
user fees led to an increase in utilisation of facility deliveries across all sub-groups of household 
wealth and mother’s education. However, they also find that more educated mothers benefitted 
more, suggesting that there could be an increase in inequity even from demand-side interventions. 
This is in line with the ‘inverse equity hypothesis’, which proposes that higher SES sub-groups, 
18 
 
such as more educated mothers, are more likely to benefit from health interventions first – thereby 
increasing inequity, at least in the short-term (Victora et al., 2018).    
 
Possibilities of elite capture 
Elite capture is understood as a phenomenon in which a small group of elites, who can draw upon 
their social, political, economic and cultural status, to appropriate for themselves disproportionate 
amount of resources available in the community. The risk of elite capture tends to be higher in 
contexts of decentralised, local, participatory decision making, where resources are constrained 
leading to implicit rationing – especially in the short-term (Lund & Saito-Jensen, 2013; Platteau, 
2004).  
Our analysis suggests that interventions in the healthcare system could be open to risks of 
elite capture, especially by richer households. We find that amongst poorer households, utilisation 
continues to remain low, even with both supply- and demand-side interventions. While this could 
be due to several demand-side barriers such as high OOP expenses, our data suggest that even 
within health facilities, the treatment received by poor households is not of the same quality 
compared to that received by richer households. For instance, at a health facility, 27% of poor 
households had unassisted deliveries even though the number is 8% for rich households – 
indicating possible preferences given to richer households within a facility, or that the rich have 
access to health facilities that are better staffed.   
 To begin with, extant research suggests that constraints in resource supply can lead to 
lower quality of care or even absence of care at health facilities. It can also encourage implicit 
rationing where priority is given to richer households. For instance, in a review of care by skilled 
birth attendants (SBA) at facilities, Munabi-Babigumira et al. (2017) find that lack of an adequate 
number of SBAs and training leads to poor quality of care, which in turn leads to women’s 
negative perception of facilities. Further, evidence suggests that poorer households are more likely 
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to be negatively affected by such supply constraints. Joseph et al. (2016) report that non-SBA 
births at a facility are more common in rural areas and among poorer people. They find that in 
Senegal, while non-SBA deliveries at a facility are common in both urban and rural areas (15% 
and 23 % respectively) – facility births by a non-SBA is more common for the three poorest 
quintiles. In a study on the relationship between national coverage of schemes and changes in 
equity, Victora et al. (2018) report that when coverage of an intervention is low, rich are 
significantly ahead of other groups in utilisation; poor catch up, albeit not to the same level as the 
rich, and only when the scheme reaches full coverage. Our analysis captures the early years of the 
two interventions, and therefore it is likely we observe the presence of elite capture in the early 
years.      
 
Implication for policy in Senegal and West Africa 
We would like to highlight three main implications for policymakers from our analyses. First, 
national averages of metrics, which are often the focus of key performance assessments in reports 
and official government documents including those used for monitoring SDG and UHC targets, 
can hide glaring inequities across sub-groups  (Barros & Victora, 2013; Gwatkin, 2000; Ravallion, 
2001). Our analysis shows this to be the case for maternal healthcare utilisation in Senegal. We 
find that while the average utilisation of maternal healthcare has improved – after the supply-side 
intervention, the difference in utilisation between the richest and poorest had in fact increased. 
Although this trend was reversed to some extent after the demand-side intervention, a central 
learning would be to track the impact of interventions by several SES sub-groups, most notably 
wealth. Specifically, in the context of Senegal, we find that there has been a significant political 
focus on UHC. For instance, in 2012, President Sall’s successful election campaign had promised 
to increase healthcare coverage from 20% to 75% by 2017; and after the election numerous 
interventions on the demand-side were initiated that increased average utilisation (Fonteneau et 
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al., 2017). However, as our analysis shows, policymakers would benefit from a more critical 
assessment of whether the benefits were equitable.    
Second, our central argument has been to show that rich and poor respond differently to 
supply- and demand-side interventions. Therefore, excessive focus on one side over another does 
not effectively meet the equity objectives. On the demand-side,  abolishing user fees may increase 
utilisation, but without a comparable increase in supply, this risks quality of care, provider 
motivation, and may promote elite capture that could ultimately keep the poorest from utilising 
healthcare (Hatt et al., 2013). For instance, in Senegal, even after reducing user fees, poorer 
households are still less likely to use healthcare, despite having the healthcare need and 
information (Mladovsky & Ba, 2017). While, Zombré et al. (2017) find that in Burkina Faso the 
impact of user fees exemptions on healthcare utilisation was strongest in facilities with higher 
workforce density i.e. when demand-side intervention is adequately supported by supply.    
Third, even though poor are more sensitive to demand-side interventions – we had still 
expected to see greater utilisation of the maternal healthcare amongst poorer households after the 
demand-side intervention. This suggests that in Senegal, while abolition of user fees has removed 
some of the demand-side barriers there are other barriers that hold back utilisation amongst poorer 
households. Prior literature suggests that these could be due to the remaining OOP expenses, lack 
of awareness, cultural practices, and the opportunity cost associated with family members 
travelling to the health facility (Mladovsky & Ba, 2017).  
 
Limitation and future research 
Our analysis has some limitations. First, our analysis does not show or claim to show causal 
relations between the interventions and inequity – instead, by comparing the changes in utilisation 
before and after supply- and demand-side interventions, we show an association between the 
interventions and utilisation by SES groups. While this association provides a strong foundation to 
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study the impact of interventions on inequity, future research is needed to examine the causal 
effects.    
Second, we shed light on the dynamics of horizontal inequity: when subgroups have the 
same need but differences in utilisation. As researchers have pointed out – often the ‘hidden 
inequity’ in health is vertical inequity: when people with more complex needs are unable to seek 
care adequate to their need (Starfield, 2011). Our empirical context limits our scope to investigate 
vertical inequity, but future research may want to pursue this question with other data.  
Lastly, as we are interested in studying two sequential interventions, our study period 
stretches from 1992 to 2010. Given the long period and limitations in data, we have not been able 
to capture all developmental interventions that may influence the two health interventions. To 
some extent, the inclusion of region and year fixed effects in our model controls for these 
unobserved interventions.      
 
Conclusion 
In LMICs, there has been an increased focus on reducing maternal and infant mortality by 
alleviating barriers to accessing health facilities. One of the main reasons for recommending 
facility delivery is that it is more likely to provide delivery by a skilled attendant, which is central 
in reducing maternal mortality and newborn mortality (Bhutta et al., 2014; WHO, 2004). In a 
study of equity across maternal and child health interventions across 54 countries, Barros et al. 
(2012) report that skilled birth attendant coverage was the least equitable intervention across 
wealth sub-groups. Our study is also useful in understating these dynamics. While demand-side 
intervention in maternal healthcare encourages people to seek facility deliveries – inadequate 
supply-side resourcing might nullify the underlying reasoning for this recommendation. Instead, 
policymakers may want to pay heed to the call to consider increasing investment in supply-side 
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intervention and also consider a range of delivery options appropriate to the need and resourcing 
constraints (WHO, 2015).   
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Figure 1. Data Collection and Intervention Timeline 
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Figure 2. Marginal Effects by SES categories 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
(1) (2) 
Description of variables Percentage 
  N=30,364 
Panel A: Outcome variables 
 
Facility Delivery in a health facility (public or private) =1; 0 
otherwise 
58.09 
Home Delivery at home=1; 0 otherwise 41.91 
Assisted Delivery assisted by a health professional*=1; 0 if 
assisted by relatives, neighbours or traditional birth 
attendants. 
50.11 
Panel B: Socioeconomic variables 
 
SES Wealth quartiles, with Q1 referring to the poorest 25% 
households and Q4 to the richest 25% households. 
 
 Q1  25.03 
 Q2 25.00 
 Q3 24.99 
 Q4 24.99 
Poor 
Household in wealth quartile 1=1; 0 if household in 
wealth quartile 4 
25.03 
Unedu Mother has never attended school=1; 0 otherwise 75.90 
Rural Household in a rural area=1; 0 if urban 70.08 
* refers to a doctor, nurse/midwife or auxiliary nurse/midwife.  
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Table 2. Utilisation of Maternal Health Services by Household Wealth  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coef. Facility  Home Assisted 
Intervention 1 (EmOC) 
Poor*Time             𝛽1  -0.062** 0.062** -0.048** 
SE (0.024) (0.024) 0.022 
95% CI [-0.110, -0.015] [0.015, 0.110] [-0.092, -0.004] 
Poor                       𝛽2  -0.334*** 0.334*** -0.300*** 
SE (0.028) (0.028) 0.029 
95% CI [-0.390, -0.279] [0.279, 0.390] [-0.356, -0.244] 
Time                      𝛽3  0.135*** -0.135*** 0.070*** 
SE (0.025) (0.025) 0.024 
95% CI [0.086, 0.183] [-0.183, -0.086] [0.022, 0.117] 
Observations 8,082 8,082 8,082 
R-squared 0.407 0.407 0.448 
    
Intervention 2 (FDCP) 
Poor*Time           𝛽1   0.081*** -0.081*** 0.040** 
SE (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) 
95% CI [0.040, 0.122] [-0.122, -0.040] [0.000, 0.080] 
Poor                      𝛽2  -0.521*** 0.521*** -0.446*** 
SE (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) 
95% CI [-0.566, -0.476] [0.476, 0.566] [-0.496, -0.396] 
Time                     𝛽3   0.041** -0.041** 0.048** 
SE (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
95% CI [0.003, 0.080] [-0.080, -0.003] [0.009, 0.088] 
Observations 9,396 9,396 9,396 
R-squared 0.432 0.432 0.468 
    
Notes: Controls include: sex and ethnicity of household head, mother’s education, whether household 
is in an urban or rural region. All models include region and year fixed effects.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
  
31 
 
 
Table 3. Utilisation of Maternal Health Services by Mother’s Education 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coef. Facility Home Assisted 
Intervention 1 (EmOC) 
Unedu*Time        𝛽1  0.041** -0.041** 0.021 
SE (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
95%CI [0.004, 0.078] [-0.078, -0.004] [-0.016, 0.058] 
Unedu                   𝛽2  -0.132*** 0.132*** -0.102*** 
SE (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
95%CI [-0.165, -0.098] [0.098, 0.165] [-0.135, -0.069] 
Time                     𝛽3  0.121*** -0.121*** 0.046** 
SE (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) 
95%CI [0.079, 0.163] [-0.163, -0.079] [0.004, 0.088] 
Observations 16,141 16,141 16,141 
R-squared 0.297 0.297 0.326 
    
Intervention 2 (FDCP) 
Unedu*Time        𝛽1  0.057*** -0.057*** 0.056*** 
SE (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
95%CI [0.028, 0.086] [-0.086, -0.028] [0.025, 0.086] 
Unedu                   𝛽2  -0.109*** 0.109*** -0.094*** 
SE (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
95%CI [-0.132, -0.086] [0.086, 0.132] [-0.119, -0.070] 
Time                      𝛽3  0.072*** -0.072*** 0.077*** 
SE (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
95%CI [0.040, 0.105] [-0.105, -0.040] [0.043, 0.111] 
Observations 18,826 18,826 18,826 
R-squared 0.297 0.297 0.331 
    
Notes: Controls include: sex and ethnicity of household head, household wealth quartiles, 
whether household is in an urban or rural region. All models include region and year fixed 
effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Utilisation of Maternal Health Services by Location 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coef. Facility Home Assisted 
Intervention 1 (EmOC) 
Rural*Time          𝛽1  0.057*** -0.057*** 0.011 
SE (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
95%CI [0.019, 0.094] [-0.094, -0.019] [-0.026, 0.047] 
Rural                      𝛽2  -0.187*** 0.187*** -0.250*** 
SE (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
95%CI [-0.225, -0.149] [0.149, 0.225] [-0.288, -0.211] 
Time                      𝛽3  0.125*** -0.125*** 0.063*** 
SE (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) 
95%CI [0.084, 0.166] [-0.166, -0.084] [0.023, 0.102] 
Observations 16,141 16,141 16,141 
R-squared 0.291 0.291 0.321 
    
Intervention 2 (FDCP) 
Rural*Time           𝛽1  0.058*** -0.058*** 0.075*** 
SE (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
95%CI [0.028, 0.088] [-0.088, -0.028] [0.044, 0.105] 
Rural                      𝛽2  -0.136*** 0.136*** -0.231*** 
SE (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) 
95%CI [-0.163, -0.109] [0.109, 0.163] [-0.263, -0.199] 
Time                       𝛽3  0.078*** -0.078*** 0.071*** 
SE (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
95%CI [0.046, 0.110] [-0.110, -0.046] [0.038, 0.103] 
Observations 18,826 18,826 18,826 
R-squared 0.293 0.293 0.329 
    
Notes: Controls include: sex and ethnicity of household head, household wealth quartiles, and 
mother’s education. All models include region and year fixed effects.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Utilisation of maternal health services by household wealth, including all four wealth categories 
(SES1 indicates poorest quartile and SES4 indicates richest quartile; reference category is SES4) 
 Intervention 1 (EmOC)  Intervention 2 (FDCP) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Facility Home Assisted  Facility Home Assisted 
               
SES1*Time -0.056** 0.056** -0.044*  0.071*** -0.071*** 0.031 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)  (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) 
 [-0.104, -0.008] [0.008, 0.104] [-0.089, 0.001]  [0.029, 0.112] [-0.112, -0.029] [-0.009, 0.071] 
SES2*Time -0.004 0.004 -0.013  0.110*** -0.110*** 0.085*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.024)  (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
 [-0.055, 0.046] [-0.046, 0.055] [-0.060, 0.034]  [0.066, 0.155] [-0.155, -0.066] [0.042, 0.128] 
SES3*Time 0.051* -0.051* -0.019  0.073*** -0.073*** 0.103*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)  (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) 
 [-0.002, 0.104] [-0.104, 0.002] [-0.075, 0.036]  [0.033, 0.113] [-0.113, -0.033] [0.057, 0.149] 
SES1 -0.314*** 0.314*** -0.290***  -0.440*** 0.440*** -0.383*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)  (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
 [-0.361, -0.267] [0.267, 0.361] [-0.336, -0.243]  [-0.479, -0.402] [0.402, 0.479] [-0.424, -0.342] 
SES2 -0.262*** 0.262*** -0.256***  -0.329*** 0.329*** -0.314*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
 [-0.309, -0.215] [0.215, 0.309] [-0.302, -0.209]  [-0.368, -0.291] [0.291, 0.368] [-0.354, -0.274] 
SES3 -0.135*** 0.135*** -0.113***  -0.126*** 0.126*** -0.165*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)  (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) 
 [-0.183, -0.088] [0.088, 0.183] [-0.160, -0.066]  [-0.159, -0.093] [0.093, 0.159] [-0.204, -0.125] 
Time 0.154*** -0.154*** 0.079***  0.058*** -0.058*** 0.070*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
 [0.112, 0.196] [-0.196, -0.112] [0.037, 0.120]  [0.025, 0.090] [-0.090, -0.025] [0.036, 0.103] 
        
Observations 16,141 16,141 16,141  18,826 18,826 18,826 
R-squared 0.298 0.298 0.326  0.299 0.299 0.332 
Notes: Controls include: sex and ethnicity of household head, mother’s education, and whether household is in an urban or rural region. All models 
include region and year fixed effects. Standard Errors shown in round brackets and Confidence Intervals in square brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure A1. Marginal plots by household wealth, including all four wealth quartiles 
(SES = 1 indicates poorest quartile and SES = 4 indicates richest quartile) 
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